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SCIENCE AND MARXISM, SCIENTISM AND MARQUIT

1. I have read comrade Erwin Marquit's rejoinder to my essay "'Utopian' and 'Scientific': Two Attributes to Socialism from Engels" with care, since I am not vain enough to believe that I could not go wrong – even fundamentally wrong – in a field so complex, so little elucidated, and so subject to conscious and unconscious ideological perversions. I am rather dismayed at the fact that his rejoinder can only be used for a polemic. I shall first go briefly through his surface arguments and follow this up by discussing their "deep structure".

Marquit's first four paragraphs seem to me -- regardless of whether I would subscribe to this or that formulation in them – basically either to confirm my arguments (e.g. his quote in para. 3) or to repeat the ABC of a certain dubious "historical materialism". His first outright disagreement with me (in paras. 4 and 5) is over "separating".

Engels from Marx I shall try to explain this at somewhat greater length in part 2; on a personal note let me say I did not at all "seek" to do so. From my fifteenth year on, participating in a minor but for myself wholly unambiguous way in the Yugoslav Revolution, my Marxist education began with Engels and in my very first footnote, appended to the very first clause of my essay, I refused a "total opposition" of a "bad" Engels and a "good" Marx (in non-Stalinist Marxism such a position is by the way, rather conservative and orthodox). But *amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas*: I did with quite some personal reluctance find that some of Marx's basic thrusts – those that I would argue have remained as valid in our times as in his – are different from and superior to Engels's distinction between "utopian" and "scientific" in that particular and important late essay of his. Not to be disingenuous, I will now go further and say that I suspect this would hold true for a number of other comparisons too but much more investigation – preferably by collectives rather than individuals – is needed before we could decide whether to really "separate" Engels from Marx; and I suspect one could never *wholly* do so.

In para. 5 Marquit rightly remarks that Engels takes over the term "pole" from Marx. But here we enter upon a basic difference between our modes of reading the classics: I am sorry to say that I find Marquit's procedure of finding isolated quotations and building an argument upon them biblico-talmudic (as mediated by the late Josif Dzhughashvili aka Stalin). To my mind, if one looks properly at the passage in *Capital* from which Engels quotes, one finds, first, that Marx's "pole" metaphor comes at the end of an entire chapter devoted to the interrelation of capitalist accumulation and the working class, which relation is explained at great length and depth in an anthropologico-economic way, which then underlies the flourish that Marx often likes to close his chapters with, and prevents it from being taken for the only explanatory model. Second one finds that at the end of this chapter Marx uses at least three metaphors – the "Juggernaut of capital", the "Prometheus bound" of labor, and the two poles of wealth and misery (Engels's quote contains the last two only). Now this very profusion of metaphors, strengthened by the similarly rich context of the two preceding chapters and indeed of the whole *Capital*, clearly neutralizes any suggestion that there is any one explanatory model for the lot of "the laborer" in capitalist production: that of barbaric religious rituals and sacrifices, that of a similar but still distinct "enlightened" suppression of subversion in myth, or that of modern cognition. By the way, though accumulation at opposed poles suggests galvanic dialysis, in Marx the other connotations of either geographical-magnetic or indeed purely geometric poles are also present, whereas Engels reduces this simply to the dialytic image; Marx's usage is thus open to new semantic enrichments – such as the accumulation at poles during mitosis of cells – in a way Engels's univocal image is not. Finally, in the text from which Engels's quote is taken, Marx argues vehemently for the "law" of absolute pauperization of

the laborer in capitalism, and I think the theoretical and political history of this Marxian attempt at approximating a "natural law", without allowing for basic differences between his own and Newton's method, should have been unfortunate enough to prevent Marquit from using it without qualms. All this, and more, is expunged by Marquit's naive (as I'll say in preference to "Stalinian") method of atomistic quoting of supposedly authoritative snippets. This example of his method shows how useless and even politically misleading it is to read Engels or Marx dogmatically (demonstrating a supposedly indisputable revelation, THE truth) rather than critically (mingling such demonstrations where appropriate with a search for A truth more appropriate to both new conditions in social actuality and new ways of understanding such actuality).

Also in his para. 5, Marquit charges me with denying "the operation of dialectical processes in nature". I did not in fact either affirm or deny that, explicitly or implicitly. But will say that I think judgment should be reserved until we know more. Many Marxists of no mean theoretical powers have inveighed against it, while others have defended it. I myself incline toward the opinion that the terms of the discussion are inadequate, and I will try to say why in my part 2. Hence, though Marquit's imputation that I consider "any process in the physical world as mechanistic" is quite wrong, I do think we should be very cautious about "objective" processes in nature, a matter fundamentally different from Marquit's quote from Marx about applying the dialectical method to matter, in which dialectics is a human approach rather than simply or indeed mechanistically "in" matter.

However, the meat of Marquit's objection to my essay is to be found in his para.s 7-10, where he identifies my main errors as disbelief in "objectively existing nature" and "objectively existing society" as the ultimate sources of theoretical knowledge in natural viz. social sciences, disbelief in science being "not only an ideology, but also an approximation of absolute truth", and disbelief in "objective laws of social development". Beyond Engels's essay, this touches upon a basic ideological and cognitive disagreement, that alone makes it worth while to ask *Minnesota Review* readers to invest some further time into it. For as opposed to Marquit, I believe there is a methodologically crucial difference between society and nature as sources of knowledge, since we humans are – at the latest since the rise of language – overridingly determined by culture rather than by biology (though we are of course also biological beings, overridingly so toward the beginning and end of our lives). We can only understand and imagine society through socially (culturally, historically) determined concepts, images, figures, representations, etc.; we can only understand nature in the same way. Culture is our privileged epistemological filter, and it is THE bourgeois mystification to say that our concepts and images are "natural", just "human", regardless of the particular socio-historical molding of our thought-horizons. I'm afraid Marquit has succumbed to this bourgeois ideology if he really thinks nature speaks to the natural scientist in some mystically direct way, in brooks and stones or pi mesons and quasars, unmediated by (say, just for one thing) mathematical logic or by other culturally determined physical and mental tools.

Thus, when Marquit concedes in his para. 8 that "theoretical knowledge of nature and society both have a social basis", I find it unclear how this basis could fail to determine what is erected upon it: unless, as usual, the mechanical-engineering metaphor of basis vs. superstructure (base pedestal and magnificent monument? – pauper basement and affluent higher floors?) has misled him too. His own wholly correct argument about support for sciences being based on class interests should have made him suspicious. How come the bourgeoisie resolutely impedes systematic investigations of social effects of science (as in Marquit's example of pharmaceutical corporations and drugs), yet finds it necessary to be highly supportive of natural sciences sundered from social sciences, as well as (increasingly in the last generation or so) of fake social "sciences" – fake exactly because and insofar as modelled on the quantifying and "value-free" natural science model? How come that an anti-social, alienating, exploiting and destructive class stands to gain from such a natural science and such a social science? How does that square with Marquit's triumphalist picture of natural sciences as an approximation of absolute truth?

2. My answer would be (briefly and sketchily) that there is only one ideological horizon and conceptual system within which Marquit's notion of "absolute truth" (of good religious lineage, and incompatible with any half-hearted compromise of also-an-ideology and relative absolutes) can be meaningfully coupled with the notions of "objective laws of social development" and of an "objectively existing nature as the ultimate source of theoretical knowledge" (for natural science only, says Marquit shamefacedly, but since he claims for social-science laws the status of natural-science laws, it is clear that for him natural science is in fact the model for all scientific disciplines and normativity). This system and horizon is *positivist scientism*.

Scientism is supposedly (rather vaguely) materialist but since it is undialectical it from crypto-religious absolutes. The basic feature of scientism is that its epistemology has constantly to derive the validation of what it postulates as "objectively existing" from crypto-religious absolutes. The epistemology of scientism *eliminates the collective knowing subject* in favor of "objectivity" and envisages sciences merely as systems of formal propositions and procedures for the construction and corroboration of theories. Human relationships in a society's (culture's) production, consumption and existence – from which science after all proceeds and into which it returns – are no longer its system of reference but its accidental breeding soil, and if only Archimedes had not been killed by an uncouth Roman plebeian we might have had an industrial revolution in the Roman Empire and Caesar leading his air force across the Mediterranean (I kid you not, this is an actual proposition by a positivist historian of science). Since it resolutely refuses even to think about historical human relations, scientism has to adopt as its reference-system logic and mathematics as "self-sufficient formal sciences, so that henceforth the problems of their foundations are no longer discussed in connection with the problem of knowledge".¹ Any materialist and dialectical approach must, on the contrary, begin by saying that science is not only a "pure" methodology with its procedures etc. – not only a *how* – but also (intimately and intrinsically so) a *by whom* and a *for what*.

In other words, science as a whole is a formally "impure" productive relationship between social groups (workers, scientists, and capitalists, say) as well as a social force with certain effects. It is never an absolute "for itself", so that it is impossible for theoreticians and practitioners of science to wash their hands of its effects – such as the concentration camps, atom bombs, napalm, and ecocide I mentioned in my essay. Now I imagine comrade Marquit would not dispute this last sentence, but his view of science forces him to assume, first, an "absolute" (or at least as good an approximation to the absolute as we sinful mortals can achieve before the Millennium) that has intrinsically nothing to do with history except that it happens to happen within it, and second, a political consciousness that has then to be imported into science from the outside – e.g. by political "organizations of the working class" (his last para.). Left to itself, science is a formal cognitive absolute, a naive, Romantic, and slightly irresponsible free soul, so to speak; but if we give it a political tutor, then it might with a few smart raps on its collective fingers start behaving properly. The essence of science is in this view worse than anti-social, it is indifferent to society or a-social; rather, society exists for science, so that the latter might get more and more "absolute".

The quite scholastic distinction of Marquit's between a metaphysical/mechanistic absolute truth which is truly absolute and a Marxist absolute which is "both relative and absolute" seems to me just mental acrobatics to avoid the basic fact that "absolute" is a religious term (be that religion deistic or, as with the pragmatic faction of the bourgeoisie and with the Stalinists, scientific). Wouldn't it be more intellectually honest to recognize that a relative absolute, or "a certain true or absolute content" (para. 9), signals a breakdown of reasoning and go back for a better "theory of knowledge"? A-social and unhistorical science, asymptotic absolute – all such contradictions in terms, which Marxists from Engels and Lenin on have in fact fought strongly against, are the logical upshot of Marquit's scientistic stance.

As for the "objective existence" of society and nature, it is one outside the collective knowing subject and thus neatly severs the subject-object relation present in all human endeavor. Though for Marquit this – and only this – validates our knowledge, it is another ideological absolutization of the grandiose development of men's technical control over and exploitation of nature (and simultaneously, which should give Marquit pause, of other men)² achieved through the empirical sciences since the time of Bacon and Galileo. These sciences have, by a process of strong struggles that made them into a tool of the ruling (bourgeois) class, grown into a shape supposedly "value-free" but in fact distorted, suited primarily to technical exploitation and control. This provides a "realistic" social basis for scientism, which "only" describes what is actually happening within science – but within an alienated or ideologized science, which has become a part of constant capital and thus indifferent to the qualitative possibilities inherent in collective human creativity and cognition. The "objectivity" of such science(s) is therefore an ideological mystification, a reduction of what is controlled and exploited precisely to the role and status of object with no rights except the one to be manipulated ("vexed", as Bacon said). A nice paradigm for social sciences, indeed, or for Marxism, forsooth! (Unless Marquit means Stalinism, which it fits perfectly, of course.) Out of such an understanding or viewing of the world and its people comes also the notion of the "objective" existence of nature, society, and their laws.

If that means that nature, society and their regularities exist independently of any single scientist, group of scientists, or social class, then this is of course correct; it was a great step forward in human cognition; and I do not see anything in my essay that would justify Marquit's concluding that I disbelieve in that. But he is right in saying that I do not believe in "objective laws of social development" in a twofold sense, going beyond the above. First, I do not believe that "objective laws" or "objective existence" are even thinkable independently of mankind. As Gramsci has convincingly written:

... it can be argued that it is erroneous to ask of science as such a proof of the objectivity of reality, since this objectivity is a world-view, a philosophy, and cannot be a scientific datum.... "Objective" means properly and solely this: that it is asserted that the objective reality is that reality which is certified by all men, which is independent of any merely particular or group point of view.

... But is all that science asserts "objectively" true? In a definitive way? If scientific truths were definitive, science would cease to exist as such, as research, as new experiments, and scientific activity would be reduced to a divulcation of what has already been discovered. Which is not true, fortunately for science. But if even the scientific truths are not definitive and peremptory, then science too is a historical category.... If this is so, what interests science is, thus, not so much the objectivity of reality, but man who elaborates his research methods, who continually rectifies his material instruments, that reinforce the sensory organs, and his logical instruments (including mathematics) of discriminating and verifying, i.e. culture, i.e. world-view, i.e. the relationship between man and reality mediated by technology. In science too, looking for reality outside men, in a religious or metaphysical sense, is merely a paradox. Without man, what would the reality of the universe signify? The whole of science is bound to the necessities, the life, the activities of man. Without man's activity, that creates all values, what would "objectivity" be? A chaos. i.e. nothingness, if even that can be said, since in reality if one imagines that man does not exist then one cannot imagine language and thought either. For Marxism, being cannot be disjoined from thinking, man from nature, activity from matter, subject from object; if one commits such a disjunction, one lapses into one of the many forms of religion or into a senseless abstraction.³

Secondly, "objective laws" has in this context connotations of predetermination which make for exactly that political deviation Marquit charges me with: if the objectivity is out there working for us, why should we subjects strain ourselves to help it along? No hocus-pocus of the Platonic, Judaist or Christian kind about objectivity working through our subjectivities can really answer that question, which has been – as Marquit should know – the source of grievous political errors by Marxist political movements. "[If] materialism amounted merely to the recognition of a reality external to the subject, then Plato, Saint Thomas, and all their followers would also be materialists. Materialism is not just 'realism'; it is also the recognition of the physical nature of the subject, and of the physical nature of his activities traditionally regarded as 'spiritual'"⁴ Having gone into this in my essay *à propos* the deterministic dilemma in Engels, I will not expatiate upon it further here.

All this, of course, makes also untenable the naive though unclear "copy theory" of truth which Marquit seems to advance under the more congenial term of "reflection", and which assumes that scientific formalizations in some unexplained but clearly Platonically mystical way reproduce the "objective reality" existing out there, outside of human practice. I can here only repeat, as I said in my essay, that even Lenin in *Materialism and Empiricocriticism* for all his perspicacity seems to me (O heresy!) to need correcting and updating on that score.

Science too is a historical category, concluded Gramsci above. That is indeed a quite basic insight, radically incompatible with scientism. Marquit seems here torn between his political and his professional commitments: on the one hand as a Marxist in politics, he must believe in the historicity of all human products and opinions, on the other hand as a professional scientist trained by and functioning within the context of bourgeois theory and practice, he cannot believe it. Thence the weak compromise of history being graciously allowed to usher gradually in the City of God, pardon me, the absolute truth of objective science. As he allotted to politics a role of commissar to science, so he allots to history the role of midwife to the absolute. (Let me add that I find it both humanly understandable and yet very regrettable that so many people who sincerely strive to be Marxists cannot rid themselves of this deep psychological thirst for the absolute, and make thus of their commitment a dogmatic travesty rather than the human liberation they also wish for.) Even if one does not wholly share the -- anyway somewhat shifting -- opinions of Herbert Marcuse, he seems to me dead on when he writes that "*history and society enter* into the theory of knowledge (and *into the very structure of knowledge*)."⁵ Marxists who do not take historicity seriously – even in science -- do not seem to me to be serious Marxists, but at best generously indignant and ethical people fed up with the corrupt bourgeois world and world-view but unable to find a theoretical alternative to it. They would, for example, logically have to conclude that nuclear or ABC weapons are the result of a "natural" rather than a historically (i.e. bourgeois) development of science; that they are a part of science's road to "absolute" knowledge and "objectivity" – a discovery of a pre-existent "objective reality" of the H-bomb waiting to be actualized since the Palaeolithic – rather than a historically particular use of knowledge arrived at through an aberrant type of human transformation of nature as destructive subjugation.

If all science is and always has been a historical category, then modern science has some particular historical characteristics. One of them is that the exasperated end-results of exploitative knowledge are appearing in social history in a major way, as noted above. A quite different one, but stemming from the same roots of its powerful and one-sided development, is that modern science has necessarily grown increasingly self-reflective. As it changes nature both ever more profoundly and in more alienated ways, making for an increasingly technologized and opaque social reality, scientific cognitions about science and technology itself become at least as important as those about a mythically "pure" nature. Just as after Galileo's time *practical experience* entered into the scientific method, so as of the 19th century *explicit epistemological concerns*, critical analysis of fundamentals of science, entered into it.⁶ I think that, in fact, this began with Marx, whose *Grundrisse and Capital* exemplify the anti-scientistic and anti-objectivist method defined already in his early writings as: "Natural science will in time include the science of man as the science of

man will include natural science. There will be one science.... The social actuality of nature and human natural science or the natural science of man are identical expressions."⁷ Such a method, of course, makes the man/nature, subject/object split of Marquit's – with all its absolutistic corollaries about objective reality, etc. – quite untenable, and quite un-Marxian. To simplify an extremely complex state of affairs, it does not take into account that science and technology, "the accumulation of knowledge and of skill, of the general productive forces of the social brain, [are] thus absorbed into capital, as opposed to labour...."⁸

Of course, once the axiom of the historicity of science is accepted, we are still only at the beginning of real investigations. The problem is then how to grasp and coordinate the different historicities of nature and human society. As Engels's staunchest present-day defender that I know of remarks:

Engels contributed to this task most especially in his splendid book on *The Origin of the Family*, as well as in his general expositions of Marxism. However,... he remained torn between a tendency to develop physical-biological materialism and a tendency to counterpose the last great "classical" philosophy of Hegelianism to the "eclectic soup" of positivist professors.⁹

3. To conclude, then, I believe that to a minor degree in Marx, but to a major degree in subsequent Marxism, there is an oscillation between two concepts of or models for science: a concept of critique and one of a "true" science. I suspect that for Marx, in that second alternative, "science" stands – in a typical Marxian polysemy – for systematic knowledge usable in practice (or, as I said in my essay, for a usable or misusable ensemble of cognitions) rather than or at least as much as for natural sciences in the orthodox 19th-century and Engelsian sense of an indisputable epistemological model. Sometimes Marx (e.g. in the preface to the 2nd edition of *Capital*) strongly endorses the prestige of "natural laws" on the model of physics and claims it for his own conclusions. But intrinsically his method is not such: for surely Newton's *Principia* are not a critique of physics as such, whereas *Capital* IS a critique of political economy as such. As for Engels, I will take my stand again with Gramsci: "There is no need to underrate the contribution of [Engels] but there is no need either to identify [Engels with Marx] nor should one think that everything attributed by Engels] to [Marx] is absolutely authentic and free from infiltration."¹⁰

But finally, the historical vicissitudes of the 19th-century Marxist doctrine are – for everybody who takes it as a guide for action rather than a religious orthodoxy, and for all their fascination – matters mainly of philological interest. What matters today is that for Marxism all sciences are radically historical, and any truth holds only for a given period with given circumstances. To take the classical natural science as an unproblematic epistemological model for creative Marxism is therefore not only unnecessary but pernicious¹¹; if Marxism is scientific (an attribute I'd personally like to preserve), then it is in a sense quite different from that model. It would rather have to do with what I postulated in my essay as being (or becoming) the fourth semantic cluster of meanings for "science": an organized body of cognitions that does not have to shut out the collective knowing subject and his/her values, that transcends the bourgeois split between quality and quantity in science. I do not believe this is a "revisionist" position. It is, however, largely a revision of Engels's (and sometimes of Marx's) views and of orthodox Marxism of the deterministic variety, dominant both in the II and III International. However – *si licet* – all creative Marxists, and most emphatically Lenin, have always demanded revisions in a number of quite important Marxist conclusions. If such theories as absolute pauperization of the proletariat or the privileged position of industrialized and liberal nations in prospects for socialist revolution have had to be revised, why should we not as creative Marxists do the same with Marx's oscillation between two concepts of science and Engels's erroneous plumping for the scientistic concept? In

my terms, why should we not be scientific and utopian simultaneously, as long as we remain revolutionary?

Finally, where I think Marquit is both strongest and weakest is his last paragraph. If there is any point to a non-vituperative critique of the historical "utopians," it is that they indicated the problem but not the solution. That does not necessarily mean that the utopian approach as such is wrong, but that it is insufficient: it is to be informed by and blended with a political commitment; it is an establishment of horizons rather than a drawing of roads (but then roads cannot be drawn if one does not know toward which horizon they should lead). And I would agree that the only efficient political commitment for a consistent utopian is one to a revolutionary organization of the working people. That still leaves a lot of problems unsolved: which organization is such, is there indeed any such organization at present, say in North America, etc. Though I take it that all this is in fact comrade Marquit's hidden fulcrum, I will follow his example in not discussing it in *Minnesota Review*.

I would only like to point out that I have no idea where he got the notion that I am unable "to accept the working class and the class struggle as the leading factors in the revolutionary struggle for socialism" (para. 10). I did not say in my article that I accept it, but I did not in a piece confined to 12 pages say anything about the hominization of the ape, the spiral structure of cognition, or the historical importance of the October Revolution either. As for my personal history and commitment, it appears Marquit did not ask either the editor of *Minnesota Review* or the editor of that special issue about it. Pray, how does he then know what I am able or unable to accept? For his information I'll add that after quite some experience I am unable to accept the hegemony of a Stalinist party; thus I regret that the arguments of such a prominent member of the CP USA as I am told he is are still so informed by Stalinist carry-overs. I will also add that I possess the passport of the only country in Europe that could still be called socialist, and that the essay he so dislikes has appeared in a Yugoslav periodical too. In other words, his *ad hominem* innuendoes about me show, I think, that it is also politically counterproductive to adopt the Engelsian exclusive rather than the Marxian subsumptive model. Q.E.D.

NOTES

1. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston, 1972), p. 68; see also his "Technology and Science as Ideology," *Toward a Rational Society* (Boston, 1971). Though I am by no means in full agreement with Habermas's approach, I find it stimulating and a good example of that epistemological reflection which any contemporary Marxist theoretician of science has to come to grips with.
2. From a number of impressive discussions of that link -- e.g. by Brecht and Bloch -- let me mention here only those of Herbert Marcuse, e.g. his essay "Nature and Revolution," *Counterrevolution and Revolt* (Boston, 1972).
3. Antonio Gramsci, *Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce* (Torino, 1948), pp. 54-56, transl. D. Suvin; see also his *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York, 1975), pp. 465-68.
4. Sebastiano Timpanaro, *On Materialism* (London, s.a. [1976?]), p. 80.
5. Marcuse, p. 73, italics mine. I do not underline the "theory of knowledge" part since I see materialism as a philosophical axiom and not a theory of knowledge -- that still awaits further materialist and dialectical research into the physiology of the brain and the sensorium.
6. See for interesting discussion of that *Quaderni di critica marxista*, no. 6 (1972), issue on "Marxism and the Sciences," especially Ludovico Geymonat's contribution which translates as "Neo-positivist Methodology and Dialectal Materialism."

7. "Private Property and Communism," *Writings of the young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, eds. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (Garden City NY, 1967), p. 312.
8. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (New York, 1973), p. 694; see also the whole argument of its huge "Chapter on Capital."
9. Timpanaro, p. 42. Elsewhere, Timpanaro rightly draws attention to Fernand Braudel's celebrated essay "La longue durée," *Annales* 13 (1958):725ff., which distinguishes between brief, long, and very long historical durations. Physical nature and human society are, of course, mediated by biology and psychophysiology, two key sciences today just because of that position.
10. Gramsci, *Selections*. ..., p. 385.
11. Gramsci, *Il materialismo storico*. ..., p. 56; in *Selections*..., commenting on Bukharin's scientism, he even speaks of the natural sciences having acquired within Marxism a position of almost a fetish or rather "the only true philosophy of knowledge of the world" (p. 442).

P.S. (February 1978):

Whilst my reply was already being printed, I found out by pure chance that Prof. Marquit had published a longer version of his attack on me in an article of fifteen printed pages called "Science as a Science" in Eleana Rodriguez and WilliamL. Rowe, eds., *Marxism and New Left Ideology* (Minneapolis: Marxist Educational Press, 1977). That version adds nothing to his argument printed here except much Talmudic quoting from Marx and Engels, much virtuous excommunication, and further evident proof of such self-satisfied virtue blinding him to a proper reading of texts. What mainly concerns me, however, is the disloyal style of behavior evident in the fact that Marquit had acquainted neither me nor the *Minnesota Review* editors with that publication. Such sectarian blindness testifies to a lack of intellectual ethics as evident as the lack of intellectual acuity in his argument. It not only makes it impossible to engage in a further discussion with him and his group, still living blissfully in the 19th century, but also furnishes the best proof possible for my final observations, in the above rejoinder, about the political sterility of the chapel mentality in the socialist movement.