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IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE TODAY: APARTHEID OR CIVIL COHABITATION?[1/] (2007, 11,510 words).

> aspice agedum hanc frequentiam [sub] urbis immensae tecta...: maxima pars istius turbae patria caret.... vix denique invenies ullam terram, quam etiamnunc indigenae colant; permixta omnia et insiticia sunt.
> (So look at these masses under the roofs of our metropolis: a major part of this disordered multitude has no country.... You will scarcely find a single country, finally, that is still settled only by natives; all are intermixed with and engrafted upon each other.)
> Seneca, *Ad Helviam matrem*, 42 C.E.

> No longer foreigners nor immigrants in a foreign land, but fellow-citizens with God's people....
> Saul of Tarsus, *Ephesians* II.19-20. ca. 60 C.E.?

> Whilst I realize that what I have been saying... is impracticable and unpolitical from the point of view of [a politics in the traditional sense of the word], I still want to claim that any politics which fails to sustain some relation to the principle of unconditional hospitality has completely lost its relation to justice.
> Derrida, "The Deconstruction of Actuality," 1990s

0. Introduction

In an earlier essay about this field ("Exile"), I accepted some fundamental lessons of Edward Said: not only his broad vision and incorruptible lay humanist value-judgments, but specifically the insight that any more or less forced displacement of people is irremediably secular and historical, that displaced persons and personalities are as a rule wilfully produced by some classes of humans in power from among other classes of disempowered, suffering, wronged, and damaged humans — who then cannot be fully comforted by any transcendental mission as saviours for other people and other times to come. As a totally laicized Christian-born Palestinian intellectual, Said was well placed to understand the need for social solidarity, perhaps I should say brotherhood and sisterhood or just dignity. I propose now to pursue this strand, which constituted the first part of that essay, in its different recent dilemmas (where the problem of my earlier essay's second part, "The Displaced Intellectual as Creative Interpreter," seems to me not uninteresting but rather secondary).

My former essay was centrally an attempt at a rectification (Kong Fu) or purification (Mallarmé) of our tribal terms by adding some new tools to the pioneering historical semantics of Raymond Williams in *Keywords* (cf. about this Suvin, "Comparative"). It pretended to no more than a first orientation, leaving out such key depth-factors as the world market of commodities and labour-power, demographic trends, wars, and other causes of mass displacement (which shall, alas, also be

slighted here). It proposed a typology of division into expatriates (largely expecting to come back to enhanced status, and therefore marginal to my concerns), political exiles, and then émigrés and refugees, the first mainly single people or families leaving for economic reasons and the second mainly large groups leaving because of political persecution including war. It addressed itself only to the modalities and consequences of people getting more or less reluctantly from an original society to a new and strange one.

I now wish to develop matters of the (im)migrants position in and treatment by the "target" society, which is today our principal problem. Even in the first essay I noted that most immigrants have the basic economic problem of surviving. This engenders a temptation to engage in officially illegal activities — such as prostitution, dope-dealing and other black-market activities, or simply petty crime — which is strongly helped along and often rendered inevitable when the ill-advised "target country" government pushes them into the position of second-rate inhabitants, denied insertion, training, working permits, etc. In that case, immigrants are often forced to fulfill the prophecies of chauvinists who see them as threats, so that I concluded: "A runaway feedback loop of mutual resentments is not difficult to set up. [This] alternative is a qualitative leap toward militarization and Police State, which is the not-so-hidden agenda today behind the hyped-up terrorist scare (that is real but marginal and to be fought in the hearts and minds of people by removing the causes for its mass appeal). The coming about of forbidden zones barricaded at will by the State and even by private entrepreneurs would divide people into humans and sub-humans. This would also render obsolete all talk about displaced persons: we would all live in an **univers concentrationnaire** without an outside, a universal ethnic-cum-class apartheid."

This negative feedback loop and the slide toward apartheid States may be prevented by affirmative action from an alliance of enlightened citizens' and immigrants' organizations within the "target countries." What may the horizon and orientations of such an alliance be is the theme of the present essay. It will focus on the political and epistemological aspects, touching only here and there on the probably crucial economic aspect since it needs separate (if converging) treatment.

1. Changes in Mass Displacements: Are Non-Citizens People?

1.0. Today we are in a situation of rapidly growing voluntary or semi-voluntary displacement, a rush toward economic survival and betterment which the British Black scholar Gilroy calls "purposive vagrancy" (88-89 and passim). It is moved by a deep wish for enhancement, and often even for a salvation, of lives. The last quarter of a century has perhaps revealed the deep springs of all mass migrations: the push to pass from zones of poverty to zones of (relative) richness; the pull of capitalist need for cheap labour. Such springs flowed during the Cold War too, but they were overlaid by the ideological conflict which stressed political exiles. The standard introduction to migration by Castles and Miller, reprinted and updated many times, concludes: "The refugee regime of the rich countries of the North has... shifted from a system designed to welcome Cold War refugees from the East and to resettle them as permanent exiles... to a >non-entrée< regime designed to exclude and control [immigrants] from the South" (107; cf. also Zolberg).[2/] This is of a piece with many indications of deep changes in mass displacements of people across borders during the last 15 years. I shall list a few of the changes, all of them coinciding with or intersecting and reinforcing the economic push-and-pull suggested above.

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<u>1.1.</u> A first difference is the impact of <u>*wars*</u>, and the ensuing mass immiseration superadded to the "normal" economic immiseration of global capitalism, in Africa, ex-Yugoslavia, and Iraq. The migration waves from Africa have mainly remained on that continent (less than 1.5% of Sub-Sahara Africans who leave their native countries go to the European Union, cf. Liberti), while those from ex-Yugoslavia have in large part (but not wholly) returned to its successor States. The estimated 1,200.000 or more refugees from Iraq are mainly in Jordan and Syria, just as the earlier ones from Afghanistan went across the porous borders with Pakistan and Iran. Thus Europe and North America have not yet seen many consequences of this wave (just as with the earlier Palestinian refugees).

A second one is the growing <u>*feminization*</u> of immigration: the UN Fund for Population report of Sept. 6, 2006, estimates immigrants at ca. 200 millions, half of them women. This might look normal, as it almost reproduces the average global gender relationships (not quite, as women are globally a clear majority). However, economic emigrants were traditionally young and middle-aged men whom families might then follow (cf. Willcox ed.). They are now often women — not only in the USA, where over half the immigrants have been women since the 1960s, but also, say, in Italy, where domestic help is usually Filipino or Romanian women while prostitutes were first Albanian but now are often Nigerian (and in Japan immigrant prostitutes have for the last decades been Filipino and Thai). As a rule feminization is — as in non-migrant situations — a correlate of badly paid work (cf. Castells 2: 170ff., Apitzsch-Jansen eds., and Lutz ed.). A considerable part of it is what Sassen (in "Women's") calls a "feminization of survival": survival of people and families through labour of millions of women zigzagging between legality and illegality — as a rule strongly abetted by the "source" States such as the Philippines, Thailand, and the successors of the USSR — and subject to extra exploitation but often self-chosen as a lesser evil.

A third change is the <u>*beleaguered fortress mentality*</u>: the orientation of the richer part of Europe and North America toward a Fortress Europa and Fortress Amerika (Japan has always been Fortress Nippon as far as immigrants' treatment is concerned). Its hypocritically hidden motive is not an interdiction of illegal immigration, economically most undesirable for the capitalist profit-makers and pragmatically quite impossible. The real end of all vexations and deaths (a reasonable estimate is that 30,000 immigrants have died trying to penetrate Fortresses Europe and Amerika each) is to keep the legal as well as illegal immigrants from receiving civic rights such as unionization and the vote, and thus the same payments as "native" ones (cf. the works by Wood, Altvater, Sassen's *Losing* and *Mobility,* Cohen *New*, and especially on the treatment of workers' mobility in function of exploitation Moulier-Boutang's by now classical *De l'esclavage au salariat)*. I shall devote a separate sub-section to this knot of problems.

Thus, politically, the main problem of immigration has replaced that of emigration (though at least the brain-drain is also a major problem for the poorer South). While there are still many politically persecuted exiles denied protective rights both where they come from and where they arrive to, the millions of people surging across the Rio Grande, the Mediterranean, and the ex-Warsaw-Pact-Bloc borders into more affluent metropolitan loci are all trying for a better life. The negative part of today's experiences is not their movement, nor the epicyclical one of us intellectuals, but the undignified and self-defeating ways (even worse in Europe than in the USA) in which national and international authorities are meeting this real problem.

Some studies point also to the growing number of migrants from the ranks of highly skilled professions, usually also from affluent countries, who can often choose where to go, and are numerous around the new "global cities." The richest among them are "bi-local," the family may indeed be multi-local (cf. Papastergiadis 44-45). This is an important development but I shall slight it here. Not only does it seem difficult to quantify, though it's clearly a minority among migrants; it is also often

undertaken for the purpose of a temporary experience aimed at enhanced status upon return home. The experience of such expatriates, discussed in my "Exile," is largely different from that of the rest of migrants.

1.2. In the age of Fordism and the Cold War migration was as a rule tolerated, sometimes fostered and co-organized, and at any rate often politically welcomed by the "target" States, and thus predominantly legal. The above factors amount to a sea-change to Post-Fordist globalized and often illegal migration. Its underbelly is the consolidation of _transnational networks_ — communicational and financial, ranging from beneficent to utterly degrading — between migrants and source countries. The pull of capital sucking in cheap labour force and the push of poverty from the "South" has spawned a huge "_migration industry_" of middlemen for illegal human border-crossing, "a vast unseen network underpinning a global labour market... boring through the national fortifications," which can be divided into people-_smuggling_ and people-_trafficking_. Smuggled migrants are moved illegally for profit, as unequal partners in a commercial transaction; trafficked migrants are deceived and coerced for naked exploitation through the sale of their sexual services or labour.[3/] There are few organized counter-measures to illegal migration, none efficient — nor can they be unless root causes for migration were to be addressed by a drastically changed trade and investment policy (119). There is no mystery about the root causes: the classical case study by Thomas about migration from the UK to USA showed that, under conditions of free trade, emigration rises with the economic gap between classes, the lack of upward mobility, and of course demographic pressure. As mentioned, the root cause is poverty (cf. Kane): the impossibility of gainful work in capitalism either because of land scarcity (as in Rwanda), water scarcity (as in China) or job scarcity (as in most cases).

Migration that was not overtly political always has a major impact on the "source countries." The World Bank report of Dec. 2006 for the year 2005 has immigrants' remitting to the home countries US$ 232.5 billion (the biggest flows are to China and India, followed by ca. 19 billion to Mexico and ca. 14 to the Philippines), to which should be added the huge illegal remittances. But in this epoch, what in my earlier essay seemed monadic State societies are rendered porous by dense networks of periodic home visits, frequent phone or internet communications, etc. (cf. Bauböck, Cesarani-Fulbrook eds., Hannertz, Faist, Ong, Leggewie-Münch eds.). Classical one-way migrants are increasingly giving way to so-called "transmigrants" — say from the Caribbeans or the Philippines, Mexico or Turkey, not to speak about the Balkans and eastern Europe, or about the old Chinese diaspora which pioneered the toing and froing. Ties with the "source" countries, including religious and other indoctrination from them, remain stronger. In countries where reception is particularly rigid or hostile, such as Switzerland, this also works against the desire for assimilation, particularly in the younger migrants from economically comparable "source" countries.

All such processes, going on with undiminished scope, have redrawn the _population map_ of most countries. Many countries have switched from being emigration to immigration ones: the UK, Italy, and Spain to begin with, but also Poland and the Czech Republic in relation to Ukraine, Hungary to Romania, Slovenia and Greece to rest of Balkans; a witty book about emigration in Italy was titled _Quando eravamo Albanesi (When We Were the Albanians)_. Globally, UN statistics count over 190 million people (3% of the 6.5 billion world population) as born outside of the present State of permanent residence. Not only is the number growing rapidly, but the percentage is much higher in richer "Northern" countries. Thus, as of 2006, in the European Union 41 million people of 462 million were "foreign born," or ca. 9% (as opposed to 13% in "Northern America"). Or: in Sweden 20% of the population has one foreign-born parent, and the situation is similar in the USA, Netherlands, and probably also in France (the statistics vary from State to State in part because of incompatible

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definitions, but US estimates show official statistics are as a rule underrated by 40-50% due to illegal immigration). In Italy, for all the political clamour, the percentage seems much lower (cf. Colombo-Sciortino).

1.3. The political correlative of the "beleaguered fortress" mentality is a rebirth of apartheid-type racism. It is at its strongest in those European Nation-States — and parts of the USA — which are proceeding as swiftly as political discontent among popular masses will allow it (e.g., more slowly in France and Germany than in the rest of western Europe) to dismantle the economic and social guarantees of the Welfare State. This savage privatization has resulted in mass transmutation of jobs into precarious, stressful, and much worse paid employments, as well as in sharp downgrading of health services, pensions, and all accompanying social safety nets for the great majority of the population. Life has become much more insecure, the comfortable succession of generations and narrowing gap between genders of the 1945 to mid-70s epoch are being reversed and the resulting tensions hugely exacerbated, the gulf of proletarization yawns ever more widely and threatens more people more nearly. The capitalist reliance on both transfer of work into poorer countries with much lower wages and the import of such super-exploited labour into the metropolitan States has been made into an earnest threat to the "autochthonous" population, since it is easily identifiable in everyday life as foreign-speaking people of different behaviour. It has thus allowed the capitalist media and politicians, as well as the revived racist parties of the semi-fascist Right, to shift the blame for insecurity from the economic policies of super-exploitation to the immigrants.

While there are welcome exceptions in some stances and some countries (cf. beside the titles adduced earlier also Balke ed., Bielefeld ed., and Rea ed.), on the whole we are assisting at a complex hierarchization, setting the native workers first against the foreigners hailing from the European Union and then against the legal, semi-legal, and illegal *"extracomunitari"* — while in the background there always hovers the opposition of Whites vs. Blacks or Asians. Both on the global scale of North vs. South and in the mass import of such imperial or colonial relationships into all metropolitan cities and agribusinesses (as argued by Balibar, *Nous* 77ff.), the spectre of a racist division into humans and sub-humans, so ably perfected by the Nazis, has returned (cf. Wallerstein's essay in Balibar-Wallerstein). The sub-humans can live in slums and favelas, their function is to be an ever-present threat to the legally exploitable jobs of the precariously employed. Castel, who induces from the French example, speaks of this as a disaffiliation, which entails the dismantling of social citizenship and public control over conditions of living that had in the Welfare State generation brought about the abatement of chronic insecurity and rise of autonomous personalities. This abrogation of the compromise between the ruling and the working classes leads to the reproletarization of entire societal groups and classes, a regime of legalized violence, and a massive production of asociality or antisocial individualism (see also Balibar, *Nous* 299-300 and passim).

1.4. As a first conclusion: It is striking that what has remained constant for the last ca. 200 years — with the partial exception of the extraordinary gap of Keynesianism plus Cold War in ca. 1945-75, which in some ways favoured directly or indirectly political migrants — is a contradiction at the heart of national capitalisms. All of them rely on the State for their existence, while not only poor-mouthing it ideologically but also as soon as possible riding roughshod over any constraints it might impose on immiseration and ecocide. The contradiction has not at all been abrogated by today's transnational globalization, because today's borders are free for the rich and the finances, less for commodities, even less for information, and most restrictive for poor people and workers: as a witty remark put it, capitals are exported, workers and the poor deported. The inhuman use of Nation-State borders is openly to be

seen by the effects of mass migrations across them, very often because of their intolerant rise (the clearest example being perhaps in the 40s Pakistan and in the 90s Croatia). It is most elegantly phrased when Giorgio Agamben asks whether in the 1789 *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* "the two terms are to name two distinct realities or whether [Man] is actually always already contained in the [Citizen]" (162; cf. Balibar, *Nous*).

It was Hannah Arendt, looking back at the 1914-45 period, who formulated the great insight that the real truth of the Nation-State is giving certain rights to its _citizens_ — rather than to _people_ or human beings in general, regardless of their birthplace and/or descent; and that this logically leads: either to expulsion, which statistically doesn't work; or to "naturalization," a revealing bureaucratic term implying that an official seal of citizenship, bestowed by the country of arrival, cancelled the aliens' "unnaturalness"; or — overwhelmingly — to a neglect that leaves the immigrants in a limbo of full or semi-illegality, where often "the only practical substitute for a non-existent homeland [is] an internment camp" (or today often a ghettoized enclave). If Arendt concluded that refugees had "attached themselves like a curse to all the newly established states on earth which were created in the image of the nation" (284), we have to conclude that in our age of Never-ending Holy Warfare we ain't seen nothing yet.[4/]

But, mindful of Epicure's great maxim "Vain is the word of a philosopher which heals no human suffering," I have now to go beyond phenomenology and ask at least in initial ways "what is to be done"?

2. Criteria and Value-Orientations: A Possible Epistemologico-Political Alternative

2.0. In quite general terms, the question whether and how far immigrants can and will be admitted to citizenship is part of the problem of popular sovereignty. Are the people sovereign, and subject only to the laws they participated in making, **de nobis non sine nobis**? Is a democracy a State in which all citizens, as Aristotle put it, in turn obey and are obeyed: "…the citizen must know and share in both ruling and being ruled?"[5/] If we transform the lip-service to democracy in the wake of the US and French Revolutions to our abiding beacon, the answer is yes. Who then might be the people or the citizens on whom democratic sovereignty rests? As suggested earlier, the 1789 French *Declaration of Rights*, though a huge breakthrough at the time, is still ambiguous. Nonetheless, we can proceed from its most useful sections. Its article 1 proclaims that "Men [i.e. every person, not only citizens of a country, DS] are born equal in rights," and article 2 that Man has "natural and inalienable rights," such as "liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression." This is a far cry from today's citizenship in the more affluent North,

> "[which] represents the final privilege of status, the final factor of exclusion and discrimination.... To take these [human] rights seriously... would mean that they should subsume the only two rights to freedom today reserved for citizens: the right to residence and the right to circulation in our privileged countries" (Ferrajoli 288-89, from whom I cite also the 1789 *Déclaration;* see also his discussion of the UN Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1948 and the two Pacts on Human Rights following it in 1966).

In particular, article 4 of the 1793 French Constitution establishes that all adult foreigners resident in France for more than one (!) year and living from their work or property are admitted to all the rights of a citizen (Santoro 105). If we care about freedom, which means the chance of autonomous self-realization for each and for all, we cannot have a good part of the denizens of any particular place

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or country consist of a free group and an unfree one (be the latter workers, women or immigrants). Half a century ago, T.H. Marshall noted that citizenship is to a large degree an instrument of social stratification; today, if we exclude most or even a large part of immigrants, we are adopting the horizon of a two-tier or apartheid State and society, necessarily developing its ghetto "bantustans" and enforced by omnipervasive and militarized "security" forces. I wish to discuss refusing such a horizon.

To avoid the Police State, our only alternative is simultaneously <u>epistemological</u>: to change our understanding of this problem; and <u>political</u>: to set up and enforce, in accordance with our changed understanding, reasonable and equitable political rules for people's living together. It centrally amounts to extending the Rights of Man to (almost) all people living under the same sky, in a community of fate: to making citizens out of denizens.

These rules have a granite foundation in the notion of people's inalienable rights, which might be thought of as centering around the concept of living a life of *dignity*. To do so, we need some fundamental and universal rights or *entitlements*[6/]: a solid minimal material basis is needed, but also a legal status that empowers the person to have serious rights against the political authority whose subjects they are, and the societal status of a recognized and esteemed member of the place's community. All of us need to eat, be secure, and make sense to ourselves, to value ourselves and be valued.

2.1. Epistemology: Images of People's Life

On the epistemological level, what is happening in the age of globalized commodification can perhaps be understood as the struggle between enforced privilege and equality of opportunities. Privilege creates a manichean dichotomy of more valuable vs. less valuable lives, with the final horizon of valuable vs. valueless lives (**lebensunwertes Leben**, as the Nazi doctrine for the "under-people" so well put it). The Cold War dichotomy of "us" vs. "them," rendered obvious from a glance at the map and the heavily armed borders around the "Soviet camp" and all its offshoots, had collapsed after 1989 leaving a seemingly united world of triumphant capitalism. But after a brief lull, accompanied by economic recession in the USA when arms procurements fell off, a new dichotomy was constructed, in a quintessential Post-Modernist move, by the interaction of the US State as hegemon with various reactions to the inhuman face of capitalist globalization, themselves more or less inhuman according to the situation of their arising. Against them various "wars" were proclaimed, such as the (failed and deadly) "war on drugs," but eventually the biggest and most inhuman reaction, dubbed "Al Qaeda," was elevated by the US establishment to the status of the Enemy, happily repristinating the dichotomy. Globalization here means, whatever the slogans, a hierarchy with certain nations and classes ("us" again) on top and everybody else more or less (in most cases, much more) on the bottom. The founding and quite inescapable structural dichotomy had shifted from a seemingly horizontal one into a vertical one. Capitalist globalization functions by daily digging an ever deeper trench of inequality between the upper third (if not upper 5-10%) of the rich North and the rest of the world: the geographico-economical South of poorer States and continents and the imported or at any rate produced South of all the slums and impoverished areas of the North.

The upper-class politics of enforcing inequality, always by threat of hunger and other indignities and where need be by mass killings, were blared in sanitized form around the clock by the world media. But in the mute depths of the increasingly dispossessed working masses, two main counter-politics arose: *criminality* and *migration*. The criminal classes can be thought of as illegal capitalists who claim their cut or share of the spoils. Impeded from direct competition with the "legal" capitalists by economic weakness and existing laws, they largely prey on the little people (workers,

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peasants, small traders, and similar) to whom they, however, present themselves as helpful or enabling middlemen against the common upper-class and rich-nation oppressors (and in certain situations, such as organizing migration, really so function). The epistemological horizon of the lower classes involved, who embark upon migration whenever they can, is truly and sincerely global: **ubi bene ibi patria**, home is wherever one can live better than where one is at. They are daily voting with their feet for Marx's slogan "the proletarians have no country." (The upper-class variant on this is shuttling between residences in several countries.) What was in the Cold War called the "Third World" has swallowed up most of the former "Second World" (the "Soviet bloc") and turned from an entity visible on the map to a substratum visible almost everywhere in daily life but acknowledged in the reigning capitalist and racist ideology only as a criminal menace. The periphery has infiltrated the center.

These two epistemological orientations, borne by the rulers and the ruled, center on opposed views of people or persons. For the ideal-typical image in capitalism man (for they usually favour the aggressive males) is a predator or prey in the jungles of competition where the abler wins and the weaker rightly fertilizes the grounds. The transcendental fetish of this view is the Invisible Hand of the Market, bolstered by very visible aerial bombings, marines, borders, and police. For the ideal-typical image by the plebeians, people — while clearly unequal — have equal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. True, in the lower classes such an ideal type is often inflected by strong hegemonic forces from capitalism or crime, including hierarchic religions and "identitarian" resentments in which somebody lower than you (by gender, race, ethnic appurtenance, and so on) must be found on whom to vent your frustration. It is therefore difficult to find, after the demise of utopian radicalism, a clear synthetic image for it which could be opposed to the Social-Darwinist jungle of the Market, but some quasi-Kropotkinian lineaments may be found in plebeian self-help collectives of all kinds.

In this state of affairs, how can we avoid apartheid State and society? I think: by rejecting the capitalist view and practice, and by differentiating the wheat from the chaff in the plebeian views and practices.

2.2. Toward Politics: A Right to Citizenship as a Human Right
I shall proceed by way of five concatenated axioms.

My _first_, so to speak _anthropological axiom_ is that _the right to people's displacement across any and all borders is a central human right_, and should today be foregrounded. As Kant told us in _Zum ewigen Frieden (Toward Perpetual Peace),_ people should be seen as citizens of a general Nation of Humanity (**Menschenstaat**_). This is not philanthropy or charity but a "hospitality, according to which a foreigner has the right not to be treated inimically because of his arrival to the soil of another person (**eines andern**)" (54). It is a right of visiting _(**Besuchsrecht**)_ based on the right of common possession of the Earth's surface, where originally nobody has more right than anybody else to be at a given place. The powers that prevent this, and also wage and prepare wars, Kant concluded, "drink injustice (**Unrecht**) like water" (60). Marx probably remembered this when he wrote that nobody, not even all the nations put together, has property rights on the Earth surface, that each generation is only a steward with usufruct, whose duty it is to leave better conditions for coming generations (MEW 25: 784). Put positively by a prominent exile, "From wherever the line of sight is equally raised toward heavens, the divine matters are at an equal distance from the human ones" (Seneca 8,5).

This is a utopian horizon, but there is no abiding realism without firmly advancing toward it.[7/] The Nation-States may become useful manifestations of popular sovereignty and societal democracy, but today their overriding function is policing labour to ensure its cheap availability. The immigrant countries gain cheap labourers without the "reproduction cost" of having schooled them (sometimes to

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a high skill), and omitting largely or fully the ongoing social costs for native labour. In order to do so, "the immigrant must have as little security as possible, even when s/he has been legalized or naturalized, in sum the immigrant must be such forever or at least for a long time, with the unlimited possibilities of exploitation which arise from this" (Balibar, *Nous* 108). In the rest of this subsection I propose some difficult, but not impossible, ways to advance from repression to cohabitation.

The following two axioms mediate *between epistemology and politics.* I draw one from van Gunsteren's formulation of a "community of fate." In the wake of Arendt's great discovery that human rights are consubstantial with citizenship rights, he proposes three theses, which I shall adapt to my language: 1/ that we all belong, at different levels, to communities of people who have not necessarily chosen to live together but find that they are inescapably interdependent, and thus have to choose between coexistence or an apartheid whose ultimate horizon is genocide; 2/ that we cannot have pure or perfect citizenships (for example, ethnically pure States) but only imperfect ones, and what matters in them is how to facilitate access to human rights to the greatest number of people; and 3/ that for each person on this globe there must be at least one locus or territory in which s/he has citizen rights, and thus also human rights. Thus my *second axiom* is that *each State* — or analogous community, such as the European Union — *should foster the maximum of economically and politically possible human rights for all its denizens by giving them the maximum of economically and politically possible citizen rights*.

The great precedent to follow here is the (incomplete, and increasingly threatened) integration of women and the working classes into a very incomplete but still worthwhile political society. The integration of the working poor is more difficult because there are globally many more of them, so that it also demands a global approach; I shall return to this.

My *third axiom* follows from the first two. It is based on Hammar's distinction between immigration policy and immigrant policy (in his *Democracy* and *European*). *Immigration policy* regulates the flux of immigrants, taking into account (one hopes intelligently) the needs and possibilities of the State effecting it. *Immigrant policy* concerns the life of immigrants in what should be — but rarely is — a host society, which is new and strange to the immigrant. The axiom is that *our value focus ought to be on immigrant policy*, which supplies criteria for any acceptable immigration policy. Immigration policy is primarily limiting and focussed on control: it is the domain of border controls and police. Immigrant policy is primarily enabling and focussed on integration: it is the domain of participation by both the civil society and the immigrants, singly or in associations. From the stance of valorizing both human dignity and civic amity or civility, what happens to immigrants in relation to other people with whom they share a common destiny is the overriding end, and all legal and economic policies must be adjusted accordingly. Of great practical importance is here that there be no Chinese (or Berlin, or Rio Grande, or Israeli) Wall dividing liberal political rights from socialist economic rights: they intertwine, and must be negotiated according to necessity and merit in each case.

In the Cold War era, relatively liberal immigration policies in the richer countries were offset by restrictive integration policies (through such categories as the **Gastarbeiter** who could be sent home at will). Today, when God and Communism are dead, *both* immigration and integration are as a rule increasingly restrictive, with a few exceptions for needed specialists (e.g. computer programmers). It should be noted, however, that there is a whole spread of integration attitudes (cf. Boucher ed.), from the liberality of Sweden or Canada to the rigidity of Switzerland and Greece, with Japan, Germany, and Italy near to the rigid pole or **ius sanguinis**. Countries following these old rigidities of the racist kind may be the vanguard of structural precarization, with native workers to follow.

My *fourth, properly political axiom* follows Kant and the much maligned Enlightenment, and in particular what Bloch calls (in *Naturrecht*) dignity, to consider what human rights might today

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entail. It is perhaps most consistently suggested by Marx's reading of the categorical imperative as a refusal of "all conditions in which people are degraded, enslaved, forsaken, contemptible beings" ("Toward the Critique," 257–58; see Balibar *Nous* 188 and passim, also Richmond). The condition of most migrants has been compared to other forms of "unfree labourers," ranging from slaves and forced labour, through bonded labourers to workers in illegal sweatshops and prostitution (cf. Papastergiadis 58). An elementary minimum human right is today the refusal of any such apartheid — and finally of caste society, soon perhaps to be genetically enforced. This right is politically formulated as "*one person, one vote*." There are in principle no second-rate people, and there should be no second-rate denizens of any country or territory (in monotheistic terms, there are no second-rate souls).

In Jefferson's words, each person has a right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This seems innocuous enough, but the observance of this axiom would put paid to almost all immigration policies on the Earth today. It points to the fact that all class privileges in post-feudal times, say from Locke on, refuse the status of full (that is, juridical) personhood to the groups they want to discriminate against economically and existentially — women, workers, foreigners, et al. — by infantilizing and/or criminalizing them, turning them into non-persons or sub-persons.[8/] The Nazis were here again most consistent by using the overtly racist terminology of "subhumans." Obversely, this means that the original and quintessential European migrants, Gypsies (Roms) and Jews, were then among their favourite extermination groups. The Gypsies still have no State to speak for them, and can therefore function as a good meter for identitarian, pseudo-racist (there are no races within Homo sapiens) discrimination toward migrants.[9/]

Of course, one should realistically add that any society has the right to defend itself by means of penal law, and such a right obviously extends to immigrants, whatever their cultural differences. Yet it can by no means follow that all, or most, or even very many, potential or real immigrants must be targeted under such law. Balibar calls this "the reign of institutionalized racism, of daily contempt and abuse of power which is, bit by bit, extended to all 'immigrants' or those held as such" (*Nous* 109). Unless we agree to sliding toward a permanent state of emergency with practically unchecked police powers, the basic principle of law that each case is to be examined on its merits must strictly be followed. Treating whole groups, sight unseen, as potentially dangerous is a clear case of discrimination and usually of racism. This is also what the mushrooming detention centers in practice mean, as well as expulsions as a means of ordinary administration rather than as a consequence for individual proved crime. Such practices are not only unethical, they are inefficient and integration-preventing instruments. Our energies and finances should rather be directed toward finding out intelligent forms of humane reception acceptable both to the immigrants and the majority of the native civil society. This begins with the allocation of resources to people rather than camps and prisons: for example, a paid interval for obligatory language courses and citizenship courses.[10/] It carries on with legal and financial help for total integration into public schools, rather than paying for group private schooling, and into normal job training programs.

I do not primarily refer here to those "especially protected" against expulsion, such as political asylum seekers, minors and seniors, the sick or pregnant, or family members of those already in a country; to which I strongly believe those who have been regularly living and paying taxes in a country for X years, should be added. I am talking about normal, non-criminal adults, for whom I would invoke my *fifth, politico-economical axio*m, to be phrased in a US revolutionary way as "*no taxation without representation*." This means that a vote should be automatically extended for local elections (up to region level) to all those residents having paid one year of taxes, and for national and European elections after, say, two or three years of residence with some proof of work or property, of language knowledge, and of participation by eventual children in obligatory public schooling.

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3. Some Prospects for Civil Cohabitation

3.1. In conclusion, "We have to admit, realistically, that there is in the long run no alternative to wars and terrorism but the effective universalization [of basic human rights]" (Ferrajoli 289). In the case of European countries this would mean, simultaneously, two radical changes.

First, a quite different foreign economical policy, aimed at what Balibar calls "co-development" between at least our portion of the global North and South should be adopted:

> Only such a project would enable us to find an equilibrium between a security-oriented Europe, that violently represses the migrations it has itself brought about, and a borderless Europe open to "savage" migrations (that is, entirely directed by the market in humans as instruments). Only this would enable us to deal with the conflicts of interest and culture between the "old" and "new" Europeans, the "legal" and "illegal" ones, [usually called] "the "communitarians" and the "extracommunitarians." ("Pour l'Europe," Thesis 11)

It should not be forgotten, even if I had to neglect this in the present essay, that all (im)migration is also emigration. As Sayad has rightly insisted, the study of the social relationships which lead
to emigration and of their continuous dynamism, is a precondition for a full understanding of all migrations, which has three centrally concerned factors: "the society of emigration, the society of immigrations, and the emigrés/ immigrants themselves" (18, and cf. 14-19).

The politico-economical precondition of such co-development is no European participation in wars (except in defense to a clear _and present_ aggression against Europe). I noted above how wars are a major source of immiseration and therefore migration. But furthermore, history shows that wars cheapen the price of people and favour despotism and a drift toward subjection and slavery (cf. Weber 6-9).

Second, co-development on the basis of equal rights of denizens would imply at least two matters. To begin with, restricting admission and treating all those admitted (in the classical French tradition) as prospective citizens. Until the change of economic policy described above bears fruits — the only long-term solution to migration quandaries — it is in the present distribution of affluence among different parts of the world unrealistic to open borders for population transfer beyond what can be economically and psychologically borne by the present citizens (but this is elastic and should be judged by direct consultation of the people/s involved). However: once admitted, the immigrants must be treated by the criteria advocated in Section 2, as other citizens or "almost citizens." This implies to my mind as full an integration as possible but without imposing a "melting pot" assimilation[11/] . No doubt, integration is a two-way street, requiring that the immigrants observe some central human duties, which go hand in hand with the conferral of rights. I strongly believe that no society can be asked to admit people who do not approve of such duties and tenets: popular sovereignty, gender parity, religious tolerance in a lay State, avoidance of significant violence (including clitoridectomy) except for self-defense... Separate schooling (as opposed to separate provisions for aiding immigrants and their children to begin learning) is to my mind incompatible with these goals.

Unless we go in for such radical, but I think reasonable and to my mind not at all extreme changes, how can civic integration, as against sectarian or chauvinist group involutions on both sides, be even begun? And how can we have civic peace, preventing both racist persecution against and potentially terrorist sympathies within the migrants, without a careful, multiculturally respectful yet robust integration? Without offering most immigrants more practical democracy and civility than the

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regimes they come from? (Democracy for the poorest and most vulnerable groups in a society is, notoriously, the only guarantee of democracy for the great majority.)

3.2. In support of this stance, let me recall some further, most pertinent statistics. First, official EU analyses predict that Europe needs the employment of 20 more millions of immigrant workers in the next 25 years, which with families means perhaps 60-80 millions! But second, perhaps just as explosive, a rapid "greying" of West-Central Europe is proceeding apace, followed somewhat more slowly by some parts of East Europe and even of North America. There, low native fertility must be compensated by either longer work years or, for the most part, by immigration of younger people in order to satisfy not only present work demands but also future pension funds (cf. Schödlbauer). Balancing pension funds — as a part of general national revenue and allocations for the social infrastructure of roads, schools, hospitals, etc. — without major social injustices will quite clearly require many more immigrants.

Immigrants are thus economically a blessing in disguise, yet they are politically everywhere a bone of contention if not a main excuse for revived racism and crypto-fascism. Shall immigrants then be pariahs or helots, as one study calls them, or at best "hands" and labour-power (cf. Sayad 61) in a dangerous vacuum of political rights and duties, or shall they be citizens? Shall they be people with more or less equal rights as their co-sharers of fate or with few rights except to be exploited both as labour power and taxpayers: harbingers of civic equality or of an apartheid society? In other words, can they be dealt with primarily as a security (or "law and order") issue, pertaining mainly to the ministry of the interior and the police, or as a complex but central issue determining the future of our societies? This is the problem that incides most deeply on all of us, immigrants or present citizens of the richer parts of the world.

For one example, Schödlbauer draws a scenario for Germany — based on the most probable forecast from the official statistics — of a "four quarters society": two quarters beyond working age, largely in old-age institutions, one quarter "native" employed citizens, one quarter of "'foreigners,' people with minor participation rights, living under the tutelage of laws aimed at good behaviour or expulsion, less educated and affluent..." (17). For another, we have ghettoized communities at the outskirts of most major cities, approaching conditions already fully realized in today's internment camps.[12/] At the current rate of immigration without integration we are moving toward an apartheid where liberty, equality of chances, prosperity for a major part of the population, and equality of all other human rights, "the founding pledges on which the legitimacy of present-day States rest" (Schödlbauer 18), would be trampled down.

In tiered societies, that is, precapitalist tribes and States, the stranger is not only a political but also a crypto-religious alien. Today the growing gap between the rich and the poor is leading either toward permanent armed conflict or back to a tiered society, probably to both. It is something we close our eyes to at great peril. Just what form such apartheid might take depends centrally on how strongly will economical and ecological pressures increase political conflictuality, and is thus today unclear. However, if the richer powers and classes of the globe continue on the present course, the probability of violent conflicts in the streets will go on growing.

3.3. I would like to oppose to this growing threat what Balibar has untranslatably called **droit de cité**, a system of public rights that entails refusing the amalgamation of different degrees of illegality (such as entry by contravening existing laws) with outright crime; it means condemning all administrative arbitrariness towards a supposed second-class (immigrant) citizenry, and establishing democratic representations by those who work and pay taxes to the same authority (*Nous* 108-09). In sum, I argue

that every human being has "a right to rights" (cf. both titles by Calloz-Tschopp). This constitutes civility or **droit de cité**, not too dissimilar from Machiavelli's republican **vivere civile** (Balibar, *Nous* 209) but in a context of world pluralism and multiculturalism. The life of equal rights in "a common thing" is the only alternative to the existing covert and growing overt violence, from above and from below.

I can see at least four objections to this horizon. The first three are, in theory though not at all in practice, easily dealt with within my present framework. The fourth may indicate its limits.

First, the supposedly free market, as it is now, seems diametrically opposed to this horizon: "the problem of democratic citizenship is... whether there is space for an experience of democracy and of a State based on law which would not be totally subordinated to the market model..." (Zolo, "Strategia" 14; cf. also Santoro). The more reason to tame the inhuman face of the capitalist globalization, while preserving the great capitalist achievement of high productivity as a precondition for human rights.

Second objection: it contravenes central ideologies of the Nation-State as a "pure" and autarchic, self-enclosed unit. But the time for such dangerous myths and enclosures is clearly passing.

Third, the objection might be that the European Union, as it is now, is diametrically opposed to the civility and right to rights it often hypocritically invokes. The more reason to change the present Europe of banks and police forces into a Europe of its sovereign people(s) — meaning all those people who in it really dwell and upon whose labour it has rested and rests. It is also the only stable precondition for Europe's civil and even friendly relationships with peoples from other parts of the world, such as those proposed by Balibar. As the foremost Italian expert on the matter remarked: "It has not been grasped how essential are migrations for the coming about of a dynamic European space, capable of dialogue with the rest of the world and of using societal resources" (Dal Lago, *Polizia* 119). Besides the need of asserting the primacy of democratic society over its executive organs, he is speaking here of the need for tackling misery at the root, i.e. by means of a different economic policy towards poorer countries. This would also mean denying present-day mantras blindly propagandizing the unregulated market (ibid. 120-21), ideologies to which the unceasing interventions of strong governments and bodies such as the IMF ceaselessly and amply give the lie.

A cautionary note: in a not too distant future we shall see increasing numbers of "climate refugees," displaced by rising waters and, in a symmetrical development, by desertification. The thousands leaving New Orleans after Kattrina may soon become millions leaving Bangladesh and other poorer countries. Indeed, a report of Christian Aid from Spring 2007 calculates their number up to 2050 at one billion (one thousand millions)! In that case, our window of opportunity for democratic regulation of migration, before the climate exodus, may be *less than a quarter century*.

But the fourth, and final, objection to my horizons may be that all the unemployed, illegally employed, and precariously employed, all those subjected to increasing and it seems boundless exploitation and domination, constitute the new global proletariat. In a Marxist analysis capitalism cannot exist without such a pole of misery because it draws its profits from its living labour; hence, whatever minor amendments to that status are within such a social formation possible for this or that smaller fraction, the status itself is unchangeable, and further immiseration inevitable. If this is true, if capitalism truly condemns a growing majority of humans to a life of psychophysical misery and (for hundreds of millions already) premature death, then we are most probably facing both apartheid and mass revolts including terrorism and urban guerillas. My proposals bet on the chance, even if small, of a radical democracy. But we cannot close our eyes to the alternative.

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3.4. Castles and Miller noted early on that the global migration process is relatively impervious to official restrictions both in the source and the target countries. It is wishful thinking to deal with it by police and armed forces: it won't go away. They reasonably conclude their book:

> Exclusionary models of immigrant rights and nationhood are questionable, because they lead to divided societies. Similarly, assimilationist models are not likely to succeed, because they fail to take account of the cultural and social situation of settlers. The multicultural model is [the most viable set of responses] to the needs of settlers, and a statement about the openness of the nation to cultural diversity.[13/]

However, our economic and political rulers today rarely follow reason, they rather ride the tiger of unbridled exploitation by means of xenophobia and panic-mongering:

> There was a young lady from Niger
> Who smiled as she rode on a tiger
>   They returned from the ride
>   With the lady inside
> And the smile on the face of the tiger.

Since the horizon of this essay is one of a radical democracy, as codified in philosophy by an Enlightenment that to my mind goes from Spinoza to Marx, I quote at parting a passage from the former, not in order to return to his terms but to advance from them:

> For it is certain that seditions, wars, and contempt or breach of laws are not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects as to the corrupt constitution of the State. For men are not born citizens but must be made so.... [I]f wickedness more prevails and more offences are committed in one State than in another, it is certain that the former has not sufficiently pursued harmony nor framed its laws with sufficient forethought, and therefore failed to acquire its absolute right as a State. (212-13)

Notes

1/ Like my earlier essay, this one does not cover most of the central questions. It omits the properly economic-cum psychological, or if you wish anthropological, mainsprings of migration today: poverty and the yearning for a better life. I attempt here only to approach some striking new phenomena arising from immigration and a possible horizon for dealing justly with them.

Preliminary approaches to Section 1 were tried out at the Symposium "Between Home and Host Cultures" hosted by Collegium Budapest, Sept. 2006, and at a lecture for the Dottorato in Letterature e culture dei paesi di lingua inglese at the Univ. of Bologna, Oct. 2006. My thanks go to the organizers, Prof. Sorin Antohi, Prof. John Neubauer, and Dr. Zsuzsana Török in the first and Prof. Silvia Albertazzi and Dr. Rita Monticelli in the second case, also to Prof. Emilio Santoro for counsels about critical literature and to Marcelline Krafchick, Joan Roelofs, Zs. Török, and Richard D. Erlich for critiques leading to improvements. All responsibilities are mine alone.

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Essays for a Counter-Revolutionary Tim,. Baltimore MD: Wildside P for Borgo P, 2012, ISBN 978-1-4344-4519-3, now also as e-book.

2/ Note, though, that most displaced persons in these years still go South-South, for example within African countries or from the Indian subcontinent to affluent Arab countries, or that they go from China and East Europe to the countries of metropolitan capitalism, rather than in the classical exodus from Europe to overseas. Unfortunately, this essay of mine is, like its predecessor, enforcedly focussed on Euro-Mediterranean experiences. However, I think the problem of denizen rights vs. two-tier societies has by now also been globalised. It clearly obtains, for example, in China's refusal of basic rights to rural migrants into cities.

3/ See Castles-Miller 115. The traffic in migrants doesn't seem to be run by what can properly be called mafias, i.e. highly organized international criminal groups, which at least in the 1990s preferred smuggling drugs, arms, and toxic waste (Palidda 220-21).

4/ In this light, the concept of a *diaspora* grows as dubious epistemologically as it often is politically ambiguous. This concept (instead of migration or similar) is meaningful only in juxtaposition with and in fact derivation from a closed ethnic political entity — as its very name, meaning "dissemination" or "seeding forth," shows. It was pioneered by emigrants from ancient Parsees or Israelites, and globalised by those leaving an existing or potential cultural "homeland" (Armenians, Black Africans, Irish, Italians, Indians, etc., later from Palestine and other "Arab" States, and today from all peripheral and semi-peripheral States in Africa, eastern Europe, Asia, and increasingly Latin America). Diasporas to my mind differ from colon(iser)s, say from Phoenicia, Hellas or England, who leave richer and more powerful States, by being movements towards potentially richer loci by people who originally have small or no power and/or scant economic means beyond their labour power or trading and artisanal skills. Beside the works cited in 1.2, cf. Ang, Cohen *Global*, Harris ed., and my "Exile," also the periodical *Diaspora* 1991ff.

5/ Aristotle, *Politics* 1277a 31-32 in *Selections* 470; cf. also 1275a. Roman law, valid for many centuries, formulated this as **quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet** (what touches all must be approved by all).

6/ The term "entitlements" has been popularized by Held (20-21). The eminent theoretician of law Ferrajoli speaks even of a sphere of legal indecidability, that is, of the individual and social rights which are in principle prior and higher to legislation. Such an approach would require serious evisions in Marshall's trichotomy of civil, political, and social rights (see Zolo ed.).

7/ Cf. also Kant's "Idea for a Universal History from the Cosmopolitan Point of View." Derrida (21) sees a limitation of Kant in his choice of the right to a **Besuchsrecht** instead of the right to a **Gastrecht**, which Kant glosses as becoming somebody's **Hausgenosse** (household member) for a given time. I have two comments. First, Kant's founding this human right on the right of common possession of the Earth's surface and on the equal right of all people to be at a given place on Earth is already a huge, decisive improvement over the nationalist, and a fortiori the racist **Blut-und-Boden** stance dominant in our day; thus a Kantian stance furnishes a very good starting point for further adaptations. Second, however, his distinction between visitor and household member — who are, I

think, differentiated by both the intimacy offered to newcomers and the duration of their permanence — points to a real difficulty that can only be overcome in the blue utopian distances of an evolving cosmopolitan contract and of a settlement which would build on the nearer and more evident right to visitation (cf. Stanton 637). A lengthy visitation with full civic rights may get very near to a membership in a locality's (or nation's) extended "household."

And it would behoove us to remember ancient wisdom: " When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not wrong him. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt...." (*Leviticus* 19:33-34).

8/ See Dal Lago, as cited in note 5, and note 27 in Suvin "Exile" for a first bibliography of citizenship discussions, to which I shall now add Dal Lago ed., Layton-Henry, Palidda, Simmel, and Zolo ed. As Dal Lago points out, further differentiations between non- and sub-persons are to be found in Bourdieu's splendid *Weight/Misère*.

Among the banalities and wooden language of the UN there may be found some useful nuggets, such as: "The benefits of international migration... not only for migrants themselves, but equally for receiving societies — are contingent on the protection of migrant rights. Labour rights are the mainstay in the prevention of exploitation and ought to be safeguarded." (*International*, point 13)

9/ The other categories of the Nazi "democidal" mass murders were communists, homosexuals, some uncompromising religious sects such as Jehovah's Witnesses, the psychically damaged poor, and some Slavic populations (Soviet war prisoners, Serbs in Ustashi Croatia). The last two categories seem due to the Nazi ideology of race purity; the common denominator of the others seems to be a loyalty overriding Nation-State boundaries. It would behoove us to meditate deeply on this, for the Nazi instincts were often unerring.

10/ In Québec, a political unit anxious and thus careful about integration, such language and citizenship courses last 6 months. Let me add that it is quite clear from linguistic investigations, in Canada and Europe, that children learn the "target" country language better and faster if also given instruction in their mother language, so that bilingualism is pedagogically (and politically) not a problem but a resource.

11/ I adopt here Zincone's definitions of integration as "the capacity of both the old and the new members of a community to accept common rules of civil cohabitation" and of assimilation as "the transfusion of a different cultural identity" (*Da sudditi* 243). Beyond the civil duties, such as those I mentioned, the extent and pace of assimilation should be left to the new citizens themselves.

12/ To the rich literature on internment camps, touched upon in my "Exile," Agier and the latest issue no. 4 of *Conflitti globali*, "Internamenti," should be added.

13/ Castles and Miller 253-54. There are many tensions and possibly aporias in the concept and/or practice of multiculturalism, which ought to be divorced from separatist and patriarchal "identity politics" in favour of both the personal right to secede from any community and rainbow-like amity-in-unity of various coexisting communities. There is a voluminous debate, surveyed in Dal Lago *Non-persone* 167-77 not only for or against multiculturalism but also between "responsible" and "happy" multiculturalists, cf. at least Cohn-Bendit and Schmid, Sassen *Guests*, Todd, and the Zincone titles.

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For modern citizenship under globalization I would subordinate unavoidable, and sometimes helpful (cf. for women Phillips), "communitarian" identity politics — rooted in small polities, and today reactualizable only as separatisms (cf. Walzer), right up to murderous chauvinisms — to the right of each person's self-determination, including dissent from phony closures. To be against is just as integral a part of liberty as to be with.

<u>*Works cited*</u>

See also the works cited in my essay "Exile" (below), where I discuss Arendt at more length. I found the best introductory overview to the present situation in Dal Lago's *Non-persone*, multi-faceted, vivacious, and freedom-loving, with a very rich multilingual bibliography. All unacknowledged translations from non-English sources are mine.
<u>*Useful internet sites*</u> (all http://www.): asylumlaw.org, displacement.org, esclavagemoderne.org, gisti.org, internal-remi.revues.org, migreurop.org, noborder.org, picum.org, remisis.org, statewatch.org, united.non-profit.nl

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